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TAGS: [IN](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PTER](#) [SOCI](#)  
SUBJECT: SOUTH INDIAN COPS CONFIDENT THEY CAN HANDLE  
MAOISTS BUT WORRY ABOUT NORTHERN NEIGHBORS

REF: A) KOLKATA 0144 B) CHENNAI 0385 C) NEW DELHI  
1297 D) CHENNAI 0083

Classified By: Consul General David Hopper for reasons 1.4 (B, D)

11. (C) SUMMARY: Aggressive police activity in the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has pushed the Maoists (also known as the Communist Party of India - Maoist and/or "Naxalites") into neighboring Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, both of which historically have seen less Maoist activity. However, police contacts in all three states express confidence that they have the Maoists under control. Special anti-Maoist police forces have been used to great effect, they contend. Nonetheless, even the police officers acknowledge that the long-term solution to the Maoist threat is rural development. The leader of Andhra Pradesh's celebrated "Greyhounds" says although he is comfortable with south India's efforts to combat the Maoists, he is concerned about the ability of neighboring states to the north, such as Chhattisgarh and Orissa, to handle the threat. END SUMMARY.

ANDHRA PRADESH,S SUCCESS PUSHES MAOISTS NEXT DOOR  
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12. (C) Andhra Pradesh,s history of success (refs A and D) has been an underscored by the recent killing and capture of Maoist leaders. On June 27, Sande Rajamouli was killed in an encounter with Andhra Pradesh police. Rajamouli, formerly the Maoist leader in Karnataka, was the alleged mastermind of the 2003 attempt to assassinate then Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu. A few days later, on July 1, Papa Rao, the leader of the North Telangana Special Zone Committee, was killed in another encounter with police. This reportedly led to the surrender of four members of the nearby Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee. K. Durga Prasad, Additional Director General of Police, who oversees the state,s elite anti-Maoist force, nicknamed &Greyhounds,8 told post that with the pressure increasing in Andhra Pradesh, Maoist leaders are looking to operate from neighboring states. &Cadres from Andhra Pradesh are now providing leadership in other states,8 he said.

KARNATAKA AND TAMIL NADU SAY THEY CAN HANDLE MAOISTS  
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13. (U) Neighboring Karnataka recently has seen a modest

increase Maoist violence. The increase started with the June 4 torture and killing by Maoists of a shopkeeper alleged to be a police informer in Chikmangalur district (approximately 150 miles from India's information technology capital Bangalore). On July 10, Karnataka police killed five suspect Maoists, including one they claimed was a member of the Karnataka State Committee.

¶4. (U) On July 25 Tamil Nadu police by chance came across a Maoist training camp in Muruganmalai village in Madurai district in the south of the state. Villagers worked with police forces to comb the area, capturing three Maoist cadres. The capture of the three Maoists ultimately led police to the camp's leader, Mr. Mani (aka Sundaramurthy), in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu. Mani's wife and two of his associates remain at large. Police contacts said the apprehended Maoists spoke a dialect of Tamil found in far-off Dharmapuri district, which raised the suspicions of the villagers in Muruganmalai. (NOTE: Dharmapuri district was the scene of Maoist violence in 2002. END NOTE.)

¶5. (C) Despite these instances of Maoist presence, the police in both states are confident that they have the Maoists in check. In Tamil Nadu, Nanjil Manoharan, Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence) told post "we have nipped them in the bud." He said Maoist activity in Tamil Nadu was limited to small-scale recruiting and training. Manoharan took pride in pointing out that it was intelligence provided by the local villagers that led to the apprehension of the Maoists in Muruganmalai. He said Tamil Nadu police actively work with rural youth, including sports and job training programs. According to Manoharan, these programs, coupled with the state's efforts to bring to rural areas basic infrastructure -- roads and electricity --

have deprived the Maoists of local support in Tamil Nadu.

¶6. (C) Karnataka police are similarly confident. Shankar Bidari, Additional Director General of Police, told post the Maoists' organization in Karnataka is basically headless and thus unable to conduct major operations in the state. He said the police could "solve the problem" in a month if political authorities gave them the go-ahead. Kishore Chandra, Inspector General of Police (Intelligence), told post that there are fewer than twenty-five armed Maoists in the state. He said the leaders are usually from Andhra Pradesh; the foot soldiers from Karnataka. Interestingly, he said, a substantial number of the Maoists are women. The leaders are armed with AK-47s, but the cadres carry only crudely made "country" weapons that are frequently non-functional. Despite their poor armament, the Maoists are often able to escape confrontations with the police due to the rough terrain and dense forest cover.

#### SPECIAL FORCES TARGET MAOISTS

¶7. (C) Prasad, who leads Andhra Pradesh's extremely successful "Greyhounds" anti-Maoist unit, praised Tamil Nadu and Karnataka for deploying their respective "Special Task Forces." Prasad said the Task Forces, established in 1990 to capture the notorious forest bandit Veerappan, have the jungle warfare skills needed to track the Maoists who operate in heavily forested areas. Prasad, as well as Manoharan of Tamil Nadu, said that pressure from the Task Forces has made it impossible for the Maoists to establish themselves significantly in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.

COPS: DEVELOPMENT IS LONG-TERM SOLUTION;  
START WITH ROADS

¶8. (C) The law enforcement officers uniformly agreed that development initiatives are the most important tools in the battle against the Maoists. The Karnataka and Tamil Nadu officers said that their states' efforts to provide roads, drinking water, schools, and hospitals have ensured that the Maoists do not have local support. Prasad of Andhra Pradesh

told post that roads, in particular, are key because they end the isolation of rural communities, allowing the government access for both development programs and police operations. Prasad contrasted Warangal district in Andhra Pradesh, where Maoists have been eliminated after roads were put in, to Vizakhapatnam district (along the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border) where a virtually non-existent road network allows Maoists to continue operations (ref B). Karnataka's Bidari agreed on the importance of roads, noting that he has put together a road development plan as part of his overall strategy to rid Chikmangalur district of Maoists.

#### GREYHOUND CHIEF: MAOISTS LOOKING LONG-TERM

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¶9. (C) Prasad told post that he regularly consults with intelligence officers from the neighboring states, as well as those in the central government who follow the Maoists. Prasad said India's Maoists have been buoyed by the success of the Maoists across the border in Nepal. He said they have a long-term vision; their goal is to attain power in India by ¶2060. Prasad believes their strategy is to cut off India's villages and towns, particularly from the electrical grid. He cited Maoist efforts to disrupt power distribution in both Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh (ref B).

¶10. (C) Prasad said India's economic growth presents a challenge for the Maoists. He added that Maoists are no longer able to recruit students from south India, where jobs are readily available. He noted that in poorer northern states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh the Maoists still successfully recruit students as many are unable to find employment. Maoist cadres in the south, he said, are drawn from the dispossessed tribal communities.

#### CASTING A WARY EYE TO THE NORTH

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¶11. (C) Prasad said one area of concern for him in the southern states is the tribal communities' susceptibility to recruitment by Maoists. He blamed government: "We talk a lot but do nothing" on tribal development. But overall he feels south India is in a "comfortable" position with regards to the Maoists. He looks north to Chhattisgarh and Orissa with concern, though (ref C). Despite his forces' work to build the capacity of Orissa and Chhattisgarh police forces, he feels they are insufficiently trained and equipped. Worse, he says, is that the political leadership in Chhattisgarh and Orissa lacks the will to take on the Maoists. When asked if Andhra Pradesh's anti-Maoist strategy pays particular attention to its northern border, Prasad laughed and said "that's where we pay all of our attention."

#### COMMENT: IT,S THE ROADS, STUPID

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¶12. (C) COMMENT: The south Indian states are experiencing notable success against the Maoists. The police, especially their special forces, are quick to take the fight to the Maoists. More encouragingly, the police themselves recognize that development, rather than policing, is the long-term solution to the Maoist problem. The first step in development, in their view, is road-building. South India's dynamic economies, of course, help by reducing the lure of Maoist ideology. But while Prasad and his colleagues are confident of their ability to handle the Maoists in south India, Prasad seemed quite concerned about the Maoists' ability to operate in Chhattisgarh and Orissa. END COMMENT.

¶13. This cable was coordinated with Embassy New Delhi and Consulate General Kolkata.  
HOPPER